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Luis D. ROVIRA
LAEL S. DEMUTH*
Born in San Juan, Puerto Rico, in 1923,Justice Luis Rovira grew up
in and went to school in the New York City-Northern New Jersey area.
When he graduated from high school, the world was embroiled in
World War II. In 1943, after only six months at the University of Colo-
rado, he was called to active duty and served in the infantry in the Euro-
pean theater of operations from 1944 to 1945. He quickly rose from
buck private to lieutenant. In 1951, he transferred his reserve status to
the Air Force, and in 1975 retired as a major in the Judge Advocate
General Corps of the Air Force.
After the war, Justice Rovira returned to the University of Colorado,
distinguishing himself in scholarly achievements and as student body
president during 1947-1948. Upon graduation from the University of
Colorado Law School in 1950, he entered the practice of law in Denver
with Harry C. Davis, a Dickensian figure who believed in the rigors of
hard work and low pay for his fledgling apprentice.
Following his association with Mr. Davis, Justice Rovira was a sole
practitioner for about a year and a half. He was then asked to join the
firm of Akolt, Campbell, Turnquist and Shepherd, then one of the larg-
est law firms in Denver. At the time, the firm had an unusual policy of
allowing associates to handle cases on "the outside" and retain fees
from that work as long as work for the firm itself was performed as re-
quired. Perhaps this policy was adopted because monthly salaries were
in the $200 - $300 range, but the practical benefit was experience with a
variety of cases and problems.
These experiences were further enhanced when Federal District
Judge Jean Breitenstein appointed Justice Rovira to join as defense
counsel in the Smith Act-Communist conspiracy trial which began in late
1954. Although this was pro bono work, newspaper headlines of the day
proclaimed that the "Reds" were getting $100,000 worth of legal talent.
At the time of trial, the United States Attorney was the future Justice
Donald E. Kelley. When Justice Kelley retired from the Colorado
Supreme Court, it wasJustice Rovira who was appointed to the vacancy.
For many years following that trial, lawyers for the defense, the prosecu-
tion, and Judge Breitenstein held reunions during Law Week.
By 1959, Justice Rovira was a partner in his firm and had developed
an expertise in the complicated and detailed field of public utilities regu-
lation, representing, among others, Mountain Bell. Earlier, he gained
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experience in oil and gas law and can still recall numerous hours of wad-
ing through voluminous abstracts to render oil and gas opinions.
Justice Rovira has been the recipient of many honors and awards
from his profession and his community. A few may be mentioned: Pres-
ident of the Denver Bar Association (1970-1971); University of Colo-
rado Alumni Recognition Award (1963); Organized Labor's
Outstanding Citizen Award (Denver Area Labor Federation, AFL-CIO)
(1976); Chairman, Colorado State Health Facilities Council (1964-
1976); Governor's Committee on Mental Health and Mental Retarda-
tion (1967-1970); State Health Planning Agency (1967-1969); Presi-
dent's Committee on Mental Retardation (1971); and, Chairman of the
County CourtJudicial Nominating Commission for Denver (1970-1971).
In 1976, Justice Rovira was appointed to the Denver District Court
bench. By the time Governor Lamm appointed him to the Colorado
Supreme Court in 1979, Justice Rovira had developed a reputation as a
fair, considerate, knowledgeable and scholarly jurist. Since his arrival
on the high court, he has also been perceived by some to be conserva-
tive. A brief discussion of his opinions in two constitutional areas ought
to dispel such easy labeling.
His perceived conservatism no doubt comes from his lone dissent in
the widely publicized People v. Quintero.1 The cased involved the so-
called exclusionary rule relating to illegally obtained evidence. Fidel
Quintero had been seen peering into a house across the street from a
women living in southeast Denver. She saw him again about a half-hour
later, sitting at the bus stop in front of her own house. He had a par-
tially concealed television set under his shirt. She called the police who
arrested him and seized the television set and other stolen items. The
Colorado Supreme Court suppressed the evidence and remanded the
case for retrial. The case, along with two others involving the exclusion-
ary rule was accepted by the United States Supreme Court for review,
but before the court could hear it, the defendant died.
In his dissent, Justice Rovira asked, "What would reasonable people
believe under the circumstances?" and concluded that, "making the
arrest in such circumstances is precisely what the community expects the
police officer to do." Consistent with this view, Rovira also dissented in
a more recent pronouncement of the Colorado Supreme Court involv-
ing the exclusionary rule, People v. Oates.
2
If his views in exclusionary rule cases suffice to categorize Rovira as
conservative, what of his opinions in first amendment cases? Speaking
for the court in Diversified Mlortgage v. Denver Post," he defended and up-
held the constitutionally-protected rights of the defendant. When he
believed the court was eroding the broad protections of the first amend-
ment, he dissented in Kuhn v. Tribune Republican.4 He wrote:
I. 657 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1983).
2. 698 P.2d 811 (Colo. 1985).
3. 653 P.2d 1103 ((olo. 1982).
4. 637 P.2d 315 (Colo. 1981).
[Vol. 63:1
JUDICIAL PROFILES-ROVIRA
The test of whether the publisher acted with actual malice
should not be applied mechanistically or grudgingly, but in a
manner which recognizes that vigorous public debate and scru-
tiny of public officials is an end to be desired. Application of
the test should recognize the paramount public interest in a
free flow of information to the citizens concerning public offi-
cials .... Freedom of expression must be given the wide lati-
tude it needs to survive regardless of the truth, popularity, or
social utility of the statements made.
5
To justice Rovira, the judicial process represents the highest means
of order in our society. The application of the law to the facts at hand is
for him a question of the practical result, the application of the orderly
process of law, and the protections and precedents of our Constitution
and judicial pronouncements. That philosophy is neither conservative
nor liberal; it is in the highest tradition of our American legal system.
5. Id. at 323 (Rovira, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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